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LONGSTANDING REGULATORY LOOPHOLE LEAVES  





The evolution of U.S. pesticide regulation has been driven by technological 
advancements in agriculture and our social desire to protect the environ-
ment and people from any consequential unintended harms. Each milestone 
regulation can be traced back to a triggering event. As a result, today’s 
regulations offer robust protections. Nevertheless, there is one group of 
people who are still at risk. That is, pesticides applicators. Today, pesticide 
applicators work in both agricultural and other commercial settings, but 
historically, they were primarily farm workers. Farming in the U.S. is tied 
to the sinister institution of slavery, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
view farming without this lens. Because of this history, and the remaining 
racial prejudices still felt today, it comes as no surprise that farm workers 
and pesticide applicators were largely excluded when regulatory reforms 
were enacted. These gaps in the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) 
regulatory enforcement of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenti-
cide Act (FIFRA) have created unjust health risks to pesticide applicators. 
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Nevertheless, another triggering event has occurred. In a recent California 
case, a Black school groundskeeper was awarded $289 million on a claim 
that RoundUp® was mislabeled as safe, despite the herbicide causing the 
groundskeeper’s cancer. Although the verdict has been reduced post-trial 
to $78 million, thousands of other plaintiffs have since filed lawsuits alleg-
ing that exposure to RoundUp® caused them or their relative cancer. An 
examination of this case is illustrative of where the regulations have failed 
pesticide applicators. The critical failing is in the exposure assessments 
used for pesticide applicators during the EPA’s risk assessment. The EPA’s 
methodology for pesticide applicator’s risk assessments are outdated, con-
fusing, and do not align even with the USDA’s policies. This inferior meth-
odology results in an unacceptable level of error in the risk assessments for 
pesticide applicators. As a consequence, products can be mislabeled, and 
applicators, such as the California groundskeeper, are unaware of the need 
to take precautions. 
Under FIFRA, the EPA has the mandate to protect humans and the envi-
ronment. By not conducting appropriate risk assessments for pesticide ap-
plicators, EPA has subjected these individuals to unreasonable risks. Be-
cause pesticide applicators are primarily minorities, a remedy under the 
Equal Protection Clause should be available to demand equal enforcement 
of FIFRA. 
The topics covered in this article include: (i) a historical view of racism in 
agriculture, (ii) an overview of pesticide regulations, (iii) the specific regu-
lations relating to safety assessments for pesticide applicators, and (iv) po-
tential legal remedies under the Equal Protection Clause or state common 
law tort claims. 
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“Change happens when the pain of staying the same is greater than 
the pain of change.” 
-Tony Robbins 
INTRODUCTION 
The regulation of pesticides in the U.S. has evolved over time in response 
to changes in agriculture as well as a growing awareness of the need to pro-
tect the environment and people from unintended harm. Today, the pillar stat-
ute for pesticide regulations is FIFRA.4 The purpose of FIFRA is to ensure 
pesticides used in the U.S. will not pose “any unreasonable risk to man or the 
environment.”5 The regulations promulgated primarily by the EPA under 
FIFRA are fairly robust. For instance, significant protections from the haz-
ards of dietary exposure are provided for the general public, with additional 
safety margins required for infants and children. In addition, the regulations 
require adequate protection of the environment. 6 As an example, the impact 
on endangered species is evaluated as part of the pre-market approval pro-
cess. 7 
Nevertheless, there is one demographic that is to date still vulnerable; that 
is pesticide applicators. Historically, pesticide applicators in the U.S. have 
been Black or another racial minority. 8,9 Unfortunately, it is a painful reality 
that many of today’s laws are grounded in a history of racism. As a conse-
quence, while pesticide regulations have advanced in many areas, the law has 
failed to offer the same protection to pesticide applicators as is enjoyed by 
the general population. 
A recent California case illustrates the unfortunate consequences of this 
failure. In this case, Dewayne Johnson, a Black pesticide applicator, brought 
a products liability action against Monsanto for its failure to include a cancer 
 
 4. U.S. EPA, Laws and Regulations, Summary of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodent-
icide Act, https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-federal-insecticide-fungicide-and-rodenticide-
act (last visited Dec. 29, 2018) (“The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) pro-
vides for federal regulation of pesticide distribution, sale, and use. All pesticides distributed or sold in the 
U.S. must be registered (licensed) by the EPA. Before the EPA may register a pesticide under FIFRA, the 
applicant must show, among other things, that using the pesticide according to specifications “will not 
generally cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.”) 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. National Agricultural Workers Survey, Agricultural Worker Tables, https://naws.jbsinterna-
tional.com/table/2 (last visited Dec. 30, 2018). 
 9. Juan F. Perea, The Echoes of Slavery: Recognizing the Racist Origins of the Agricultural and 
Domestic Worker Exclusion from the National Labor Relations Act., 72 LOY. U. CHI., SCH. OF LAW, LAW 
ECOMMONS, 95-138 (2011), https://lawecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1150&con-
text=facpubs (last visited Dec 18, 2018). 
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warning on the label of the common herbicide glyphosate (trade name 
Roundup®).10 Johnson claimed that because of this lack of warning, his ex-
posure to glyphosate during his daily work as a school groundskeeper caused 
him to develop cancer.11 The jury agreed with Johnson, and awarded him 
$289 million in damages.12 Although the damages have been reduced to $78 
million post-trial,13 thousands of others have filled similar lawsuits since this 
verdict.14   To date, more than 18,400 other plaintiffs have filed suits com-
plaining that RoundUp® caused cancer while Monsanto claimed it was 
safe.15 
Given the magnitude of this award and number of new plaintiffs, perhaps 
the time has finally come to trigger new legislation that will address the needs 
of pesticide applicators and remove the scar of racism from the FIFRA. 
I. PESTICIDE APPLICATORS AND RACE, A HISTORICAL VIEW 
The U.S. agricultural industry was built, and ultimately thrived, on the la-
bor provided by indentured servants and slaves, throughout the seventeenth, 
eighteenth, nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.16 In the 1600s, immi-
grants from Europe came to America looking for new opportunities.17 How-
ever, what immigrants found oftentimes was indentured servitude masquer-
aded as agricultural opportunity. Indentured servitude provided the European 
immigrants with food and shelter, but little else. As the demand for more 
workers rose, and with European immigrant numbers dwindling, the planta-
tion owners turned to slave labor as the preferred alternative.18 From the 
 
 10. Johnson v. Monsanto Co., No. CGC-16-550128, 2018 WL 2324413 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 17, 
2018) and Johnson v. Monsanto Co., No. CGC-16-550128, 2018 WL 2324413 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 
2018). (Judge denied Monsanto’s motion for summary judgement; held a reasonable jury could find that 
Monsanto sought to influence scientific literature, suppress internal concern over risks, and prevent the 
public from learning of risks to avoid liability. Jury verdict found by clear and convincing evidence that 
Monsanto acted with “malice or oppression” and awarded damages, including punitive, for claims of de-
sign defect, strict liability with failure to warn, and negligent failure to warn.) 
 11. Id. 
 12. Johnson, 2018 WL 2324413 (Real damages awarded were past economic loss at $819,882, fu-
ture economic loss at $1,433,327, past noneconomic loss at $4,000,00, future noneconomic loss at 
$33,000,00. Punitive damages awarded at $250,000,000.) 
 13. Daniel Siegal, The Verdicts That Left A Mark In 2018, Law360 (December 17, 2018, 5:51 PM 
EST) , https://www.law360.com/articles/1109456/the-verdicts-that-left-a-mark-in-2018. (The punitive 
damages awarded in the trial were reduced from $250 million to $39.25 million). 
 14. Tina Bellon, U.S. judge selects first case in federal Monsanto weed-killer litigation, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bayer-glyphosate-lawsuit/u-s-judge-selects-first-case-in-federal-
monsanto-weed-killer-litigation-idUSKCN1NP2HZ (last visited Dec. 29, 2018). 
 15. Monsanto Papers, Roundup (Glyphosate) Cancer Cases: Key Documents & Analysis, U.S. Right 
to Know, Https://Usrtk.Org/Monsanto-papers/(Last Visited Aug. 13, 2019). 
 16. Marc Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act: Racial Discrimination in the 
New Deal, 65 TEXAS LAW REVIEW, 1335-1393 (1987). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
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eighteenth century until the abolition of slavery, the agricultural industry was 
a source of tremendous wealth generation for plantation owners, fueled by 
the free labor that the barbaric practice of slavery provided. It is this founda-
tion of free labor and extreme cruelty that the house of racism in U.S. agri-
culture is built upon. 
At its core, agriculture is a very labor-intensive industry and slavery pro-
vided an unmistakable financial advantage by which slaveholders could 
amass wealth in an incredibly short period of time.19 It is with that purpose 
in mind, and the nature of competition, that plantation owners everywhere 
sought to also gain the same competitive advantage.20 With such a direct re-
lationship established between racial cruelty and profit, it is safe to say rac-
ism became deeply ingrained and intertwined with the agricultural industry. 
Slaves were forced to work long hours in the blistering heat with no consid-
eration for their well-being. Slaves were viewed as property, not people. Sim-
ilar to a wagon, a hammer, or a shovel, as property slaves were not afforded 
any human rights. Harvesting crops became synonymous with slave labor, 
and that really did not matter at all. The work of a plantation or farm laborers 
was looked down upon and thought to be the type of work reserved for people 
that did not matter. If someone worked in the fields, then they were viewed 
as beneath others. 
There is a very similar view held today regarding migrants who are pri-
marily employed as seasonal workers in the agriculture industry.21 While 
slavery is on a completely different magnitude than the mistreatment of mi-
grant farmers, there is a common thread between both marked by the power 
relationship between the laborer and the one who owns the fruits of those 
labors.22 Even in today’s agriculture industry, benefits are largely reaped by 
the owners of the crops, fueled by a labor force that is oft-regarded as being 
sub-human or, at the very least, of lesser importance.23 This relationship is 
seen by some as an exploitation of a vulnerable group of people meant to 
generate profit, forming a common thread between slaves of the past and mi-
grant workers of today.24 
It is with this context in mind that we consider the modern version of in-
stitutional racism in agriculture. Today, similar to slave labor used in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, those who are working in the fields are 
 
 19. See Juan F. Perea supra note 6. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
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the most vulnerable. There is inadequate consideration given with respect to 
protecting field workers from the dangerous chemicals used to protect crops. 
The use of pesticides and insecticides in the agricultural industry is not 
new.25 Archaic methods of the application of pesticides have been used for 
thousands of years.26 However, the proliferation of pesticide use exploded 
after World War II. Consider that most farms are family owned and the suc-
cess of crops could very well mean the difference between life and death; 
there are clear motivations in finding solutions to protect crops against insects 
and various weed infestations. 
The question is, what is the cost of the use of these dangerous pesticides? 
Historically, the answer has been looked at from the standpoint of the con-
sumer. However, in this instance, the goal is to examine the danger from the 
point of view of the workers who are handling the chemicals on a daily basis. 
What is the cost to them? 
A. Crisis of the New Deal 
The New Deal was a series of programs enacted by Franklin Delano Roo-
sevelt, between 1933 and 1938, as a way to stabilize the economy and move 
the U.S. out of the Great Depression.27 It included several programs that im-
plemented social service mechanisms throughout the country.28 Specifically, 
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA) were key programs designed to help industry by providing much 
needed funding to jump-start the economy.29 The Acts also provided assis-
tance to those in poverty and those that were unemployed.30 However, to get 
the legislation passed, there were a series of compromises made that stripped 
away protections for the very group of people that the legislation was de-
signed to help.31 These compromises were very similar to the Three-Fifths 
Compromise made during the Constitutional Convention of 1787, when the 
legislature decided that slaves would count as three-fifths of a person for the 
purpose of determining state populations.32 Because of the huge disparity in 
the number of slaves dispersed between the North and the South, the southern 
states had the advantage of far more representation in Congress.33 The 
 
 25. See Linder, supra note 13. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Juan Perea, Destined for Servitude, 44 U. OF S. F. L. REV., 245-252 (2010). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
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unequal representation remained present through the Great Depression.34 Be-
cause of this advantage, southern politicians possessed the power to force 
more compromises in laws that affected them. Specifically, both the NLRA 
and the FLSA provided protections for “employees” in the original version 
of the legislation.35 However, following an outcry from the southern politi-
cians, the term “employee” was defined to exclude agricultural workers.36 
Considering that at the time of the New Deal over fifty percent of farm 
workers in the South were Black and that eighty-seven percent of all Black 
agriculture workers resided in the former Confederate States, the impact of 
the exclusion was clear and dramatic.37 By 1940, that percentage rose to 
ninety-two percent.38 This meant that agriculture workers, who worked in 
some of the harshest conditions, received very few protections.39 This also 
meant that the White landowners would legally have the ability to force the 
workers to work longer hours for lower pay with no possible recourse. 
More specific to the FLSA, given the number of Black agriculture workers 
in the South vastly outnumbered those in the North, any changes to the min-
imum wage would have a much larger impact in the South than the North.40 
As such, the Southern politicians fought to ensure that agriculture workers 
were not considered in any discussions concerning minimum wage increases 
for workers. For example, Representative J. Mark Wilcox of Florida stated: 
[T]here is another matter of great importance in the South, and that is the 
problem of our Negro labor. There has always been a difference in the wage 
scale of white and colored labor. . . . You cannot put the Negro and the 
white man on the same basis and get away with it. Not only would such a 
situation result in grave social and racial conflicts but it would also result in 
throwing the Negro out of employment and in making him a public 
charge.41 
Consequently, agricultural workers were excluded from enjoying any bene-
fits of the FLSA. 
 
 34. Howard A Ohline, Republicanism and Slavery: Origins of the Three-Fifths Clause in the U.S. 
Constitution, 28 THE WILLIAM AND MARY QUARTERLY, 563–584 (1971). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Delaplane, K., Pesticide usage in the U.S.: History, benefits, risks, and trends (1996), http://peo-
ple.forestry.oregonstate.edu/steve-strauss/sites/people.forestry.oregonstate.edu.steve-strauss/files/Pes-
tUse1996.pdf. 
 41. Perea, supra note 24. 
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B. Current Status: Same Story, Different Minority 
Today the vast majority of agriculture workers are Hispanic.42 According 
to the National Agricultural Workers Survey, seventy percent of hired and 
ninety-seven percent of contract farm workers are foreign born, and seventy-
five percent of hired and ninety-nine percent of contract workers are His-
panic/Latino.43 With the shift in time and demographics, the NLRA and the 
FLSA have not yet been updated to include agriculture workers as “employ-
ees.”44 As such, this new population of immigrant agricultural workers rou-
tinely face some of the same hostile work environments as the agriculture 
workers of the past and earn far below minimum wage. 
C. Lack of Protection Under Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration 
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) was the 
source of a landmark piece of legislation that provided oversight for work-
place safety in 1970.45 However, in 1976 after opposition that arose from its 
passage, there was an exemption put into place for farms that had fewer than 
ten workers.46 This meant these farms were exempted from any of the safety 
standards required by the Act.47 It also meant that these farms were not sub-
ject to any penalties for unsafe work conditions. This exemption was still 
passed in light of testimony that revealed farm work had some of the highest 
numbers of injuries and deaths for employees in any modern industry.48 
Many saw this exemption as a solely financially motivated policy. How-
ever, given the nationalities of those who work the farms, the history of labor 
rights in agriculture, and the historic disparity of racial groups in the U.S., it 
is easy to show how race might have an impact in these legislative decisions. 
Because farm workers are historically poor or considered unworthy, this de-
mographic has lacked the power and social capital to motivate the same leg-
islative protections that today are enjoyed by the rest of society. 
 
 42. Id. at 251. 
 43. Nᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ Aɢʀɪᴄᴜʟᴛᴜʀᴀʟ Wᴏʀᴋᴇʀs Sᴜʀᴠᴇʏ, Aɢʀɪᴄᴜʟᴛᴜʀᴀʟ Wᴏʀᴋᴇʀ TᴀBʟᴇs, 
https://naws.jbsinternational.com/table/2 (last visited Dec. 30, 2018) (Contributors are Department of La-
bor’s Employment and Training Administration, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health, and the Health Resources and Services Administration to serving migrant and seasonal agricul-
tural workers). 
 44. See Juan F. Perea supra note 6. 
 45. Timothy W Kelsey, The Agrarian Myth and Policy Responses to Farm Safety, 84 AM. J. OF PUB. 
HEALTH, 1171-1177 (1994). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
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II. HISTORICAL MILESTONES IN PESTICIDE REGULATIONS 
The first law to regulate pesticides in the U.S. was limited to protecting the 
economic needs of farmers and cattlemen, and the U.S. Department of Agri-
culture (USDA) was the sole agency responsible for pesticide regulations. 
Over time, the scope and complexity of the regulations increased as aware-
ness of risks grew, and at each regulatory milestone a new risk was addressed. 
Today, the EPA has the primary accountability, while the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), the USDA, and OSHA all share some regulatory 
oversight. Currently, regulations provide environmental as well as many hu-
man health protections, alongside addressing the economic needs of growers. 
A. Insecticide Act of 1910 
The first milestone in pesticide regulation was the passage of Insecticide 
Act of 1910. This law referred to pesticides as “economic poisons.”49 The 
law, for the purpose of protecting the grower, prohibited the manufacture, 
sale, and transportation of insecticides that were adulterated or misbranded.50 
The law centered on labelling requirements, and was meant to prevent chem-
ical manufacturers from selling products that caused inadvertent injury to the 
farmers’ crops.51 
B. FIFRA 1947 and the Delaney Report 
The next milestone occurred in 1947, when Congress passed FIFRA. This 
law amended and took the place of the Insecticide Act of 1910.52 The 1947 
FIFRA expanded the economic poisons to include herbicides and rodenti-
cides.53 The primary focus of this early version of FIFRA remained on label-
ling requirements, and the purpose was to eliminate “puffing” by the manu-
facturers.54 However, in this post World War II era, new technologies, such 
as synthetic pesticides and the use of antibiotics in livestock, was driving a 
 
 49. FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, § 8.02 (Matthew Bender, 2018). 
 50. FEDERAL INSECTICIDE ACT OF 1910, PUB. L. NO. 61-152, 36 STAT. 331, 332-335 (1910) (re-
pealed by FIFRA 1947). (Adulterated articles were prohibited from distribution and sale, where “adulter-
ated” referred to product strength and purity which might “reduce, lower, or injuriously” affect the quality 
of the product.) 
 51. Id. 
 52. FEDERAL INSECTICIDE, FUNGICIDE, AND RODENTICIDE ACT OF 1947, PUB. L. NO. 80-104, 61 
STAT. 163, 164-173 (1947). 
 53. Id. 
 54. See GRAD, supra note 46 at § 8.03 (Although FIFRA 1947 took into consideration risks to the 
public, and not just economic harm to the grower, sanctions for mislabeled products were limited to “puff-
ing” or exaggerated claims by the manufacturers). 
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reorganization of agriculture.55 Because of these changes, there was growing 
concern of harms caused by chemicals unintentionally added to foods.56 As 
a result, in 1950 a Congressional committee, led by Congressman James 
Delaney of New York, was created to investigate the effects of using chemi-
cals in food production.57 
The Delaney Report generated by this committee concluded that although 
the farmers’ economic interests were protected by the labelling requirements 
under FIFRA 1947, protection for public safety was insufficient.58 The report 
pointed out that the FDA, who under the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic 
Act (FFDCA) was responsible for safeguarding the food supply, had no input 
to assess the safety of pesticide residues on foods.59 Consequently, the USDA 
could approve a chemical for market release under FIFRA, without any 
safety assessment for the food consumer.60 The Delaney Report recom-
mended to expand the FFDCA by requiring safety data for pesticide residues 
on foods.61 These data would be similar to that required for new drugs, 
whereby a full safety assessment would be required prior to market launch.62 
However, there was concern that the recommendations were too cumber-
some, and new legislation was not immediately enacted.63 
C. Miller and Food Additive Amendments to the FFDCA 
Nevertheless, the Delaney Report triggered a series of hearings, in which 
Congress addressed the varied concerns of growers, chemical manufacturers, 
consumers, and state and federal regulators to draft new legislation.64 As a 
result, in 1954 Congress passed the Miller Amendment of the FFDCA.65 This 
amendment gave the U.S. government the authority to set tolerances for 
 
 55. See Kendra Smith-Howard, Antibiotics and Agricultural Change: Purifying Milk and Protecting 
Health in the Postwar Era, 84 AGR. HIST. 327, 327-346 (2010) (As a result of a “technological reorgani-
zation of agriculture” in the post-World War II era Americans were faced with confronting what consti-
tutes pure food). 
 56. Id. at 329-30 (After World War II, developing nuclear technology as well as pharmaceutical and 
chemical industries “gave rise to disquieting unease about the place of modern technology in human life” 
with the purity of food a primary concern. “Technologies once glorified as modern marvels became anx-
iety inducing. The ubiquity of synthetic chemicals stirred misgivings about a poisoned world.”). 
 57. House of Representatives Select Committee to Investigate the Use of Chemicals in Food Prod-
ucts, H. Rep. No. 323, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1950). 
 58. Delaney Report, H. Rep. No. 2356, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1952). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See GRAD, supra note 46. 
 64. Id. 
 65. FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT, AMENDMENT., PUB. L. NO. 83-518, 68 STAT. 511 
(1954). 
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residues of pesticides on foods for the first time.66 In the Miller Amendment, 
Congress gave this authority to the Secretary of Health, Education and Wel-
fare (i.e., FDA).67 
The next significant change to the regulations occurred in 1958 when Con-
gress passed the Food Additives Amendment of the FFDCA.68 This amend-
ment contained a provision which later became determinative in setting the 
safety standards used today. This provision, referred to as the “Delaney 
Clause” required a zero-tolerance for carcinogens.69 That is, the Delaney 
Clause provided that no food additive, as are pesticides, would be approved 
if testing determined residues in foods were detectable and the chemical was 
carcinogenic to people or animals.70 
D. Silent Spring and the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act 
of 1972 
The 1960’s brought new and different concerns with the publication of 
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring.71 In this seminal work, which has been recog-
nized as the inspiration of the modern environmental movement, Rachel Car-
son used a literary vehicle of a “fable of tomorrow” to explore the harms 
resulting from DDT, a popular insecticide in use at the time.72 Once again, 
social awareness triggered changes in the law and government oversight. 
First, the EPA was established by President Nixon on July 9, 1970 under the 
Reorganization Plan No.3 of 1970.73 Second, it became clear there were key 
regulatory shortcomings as no law provided provisions to protect the envi-
ronment or those who applied pesticides.74 
To address these issues and other issues, FIFRA was amended again with 
the passage of the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act (FEPCA) on 
October 21, 1972.75 Under the 1972 amendment to FIFRA, Congress gave 
the Administrator of the EPA the authority to regulate the sale, distribution, 
and application of pesticides.76 The EPA now had the authority once held by 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. FOOD ADDITIVES AMENDMENT OF 1958, PUB. L. NO. 85-929, 72 STAT. 1784 (1958). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Nᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ Rᴇꜱᴇᴀʀᴄʜ Cᴏᴜɴᴄɪʟ (U.S.) Cᴏᴍᴍɪᴛᴛᴇᴇ ᴏɴ Dɪᴇᴛ, Nᴜᴛʀɪᴛɪᴏɴ, ᴀɴᴅ Cᴀɴᴄᴇʀ, The Delaney 
Clause and Other Regulatory Action, DIET, NUTRITION, AND CANCER (National Academies Press, 1982). 
 71. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (Houghton Mifflin Company, 2002) (1962). 
 72. Id. 
 73. U.S. EPA, Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, https://archive.epa.gov/epa/aboutepa/reorganiza-
tion-plan-no-3-1970.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2018). 
 74. See GRAD, supra note 46. 
 75. FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL PESTICIDE CONTROL ACT OF 1972, PUB. LAW NO. 92-516, 86 STAT. 
973 (1972). 
 76. Id. 
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the USDA and the FDA. Another key provision in this 1972 amendment was 
the establishment of a certification process for pesticide applicators.77 Now, 
“restricted” pesticides could only be applied by or under the direct supervi-
sion of a certified applicator.78 Furthermore, the term economic poison was 
replaced with “pesticide,” which is still in effect today.79 This reflects the 
shift in focus of the new law away from the economic concerns of the farmer, 
and more towards protecting people and the environment. 
Originally, the EPA had planned to re-register all pesticides according to 
the new requirements by 1975.80 However, it was not until October of 1977 
that the EPA promulgated all of the necessary regulations to fully implement 
the 1972 FEPCA amendment to FIFRA.81 By the late 1980’s it was clear that 
the EPA’s regulatory work was progressing too slowly.82 The Agency was 
not resourced adequately for the substantial legislative task.83 
E. FIFRA ‘88, the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, and Beyond 
To address the slow pace of re-registration, in 1988 Congress passed the 
next major milestone revision to the FIFRA (FIFRA ‘88). A main feature of 
this amendment was to mandate timelines and increase the EPA’s resourcing 
by establishing a system for the Agency to collect fees from the registrants. 
The next major change to the pesticide registration process occurred in 
1996, with the passage of the Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA). This act 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Digest of Federal Resource Laws of Interest to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Federal En-
vironmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, https://www.fws.gov/laws/lawsdigest/fedenvp.html (last vis-
ited Dec. 29, 2018). 
 79. See GRAD, supra note 46. 
 80. Report of the House Committee on Agriculture, H.R.Rep.No.939, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 
 81. See GRAD, supra note 46. (Although the FEPCA was enacted on Oct. 21, 1972 to amend FIFRA, 
a five-year delay was included within the Act to delay some provisions and requirements until Oct. 21, 
1977.) 
 82. Kᴀᴛʜʟᴇᴇɴ A. Fᴀɢᴇʀꜱᴛᴏɴᴇ, Rᴏɢᴇʀ W. Bᴜʟʟᴀʀᴅ, ᴀɴᴅ Cʀᴀɪɢ A. Rᴀᴍᴇʏ, Politics and Economics of 
Maintaining Pesticide Registrations, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTEENTH VERTEBRATE PEST 
CONFERENCE 1990.28 (1990), http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/vpc14/28 (Last visited Dec. 30, 2019) (“The 
1972 Amendments to FIFRA mandated that all pesticides must meet registration data requirements (be 
reregistered) within a 5-year period. Under the process established in 1972 and refined in subsequent 
amendments, Registration Standards were issued to establish data requirements for individual pesticides. 
These standards were issued for 194 pesticides of greatest concern to EPA. In addition, Data Call-Ins were 
issued for other pesticides of concern including vertebrate pesticides like strychnine and 1080. By 1987, 
despite submission of reams of data by registrants, fewer than 5 chemicals (out of 611 active ingredients) 
had been reregistered (all data provided, and all registration and tolerance decisions completed). As a 
consequence, public pressure to speed up the reregistration process prompted Congress to pass the 1988 
Amendments to FIFRA, which were signed into law on October 25, 1988, and became effective December 
24, 1988. This version of FIFRA is frequently called “FIFRA 88” or “FIFRA LITE” (the latter term used 
by some groups because the final amendment carried fewer provisions than these groups had antici-
pated).”). 
 83. Id. 
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was passed partially as a result of a lawsuit brought by a coalition of envi-
ronmental groups who sued the EPA for failing to enforce a zero-tolerance 
policy for carcinogens as required under the Delaney Clause.84 The FQPA 
amended both FIFRA and the FFDCA to revoke Delaney, as it was deter-
mined that both were outdated and unreasonable.85 Nevertheless, environ-
mental advocates were pleased with the passage of the FQPA because it pro-
vided modernized, uniform safety requirements for tolerance assessments, 
and in particular, gave additional protections for infants and children.86 
In 2003, FIFRA and the FFDCA were amended again under the Pesticide 
Registration Improvement Act of 2003 (PRIA), which provided some admin-
istrative changes to help provide the pesticide registrants a more predictable 
and timely registration and process.87 Congress has not passed any major re-
vision to the pesticide statues since the passage of the PRIA. 
III. CURRENT PESTICIDE REGULATIONS 
Today, the EPA regulates pesticides primarily through the enabling legis-
lation of FIFRA and the tolerance setting provisions of the FFDCA.88 An-
other supporting statute is the Endangered Species Act (ESA).89 Under the 
ESA, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service works together with the EPA to pro-
tect endangered species and their designated critical habitats.90 While the 
EPA is the main driver of pesticide regulation at the national level, several 
other federal and state agencies play important roles.91 For example, the EPA 
sets the tolerance limits for pesticide residues on foods, but it does not con-
duct the sampling and analysis of foods which is necessary to enforce these 
limits.92 This task is shared between the USDA, the FDA, and the state agen-
cies.93 
The first step in the regulatory process is the pre-market approval by the 
EPA. Before it can be sold, the chemical manufacturer must register the pes-
ticide with the EPA.94 While the definition of “pesticide” in the statutory 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. PESTICIDE REGISTRATION IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2003, PUB. LAW. NO. 108-199, 118 STAT. 3 
(2004). 
 88. U.S. EPA, About Pesticide Registration, Federal Pesticide Laws, https://www.epa.gov/pesti-
cide-registration/about-pesticide-registration (last visited Dec. 29, 2018). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Nᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ Pᴇꜱᴛɪᴄɪᴅᴇ Iɴꜰᴏʀᴍᴀᴛɪᴏɴ Cᴇɴᴛᴇʀ, Other Federal Agencies Regulating Pesticides, 
http://npic.orst.edu/reg/otherregfed.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2018). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. FEDERAL INSECTICIDE, FUNGICIDE, AND RODENTICIDE ACT 7 U.S.C. § 136a (2017). 
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language is fairly specific and detailed, it is, in essence, any product that is 
intended for use in controlling organisms that are considered pests.95 
The EPA Administrator has the authority, through this regulatory process, 
to control the use and sale of pesticides to prevent “any unreasonable risk to 
man or the environment.”96 The registration of pesticides, therefore, involves 
a scientific, risk-based evaluation of data submitted by the registrant, gener-
ated to assess human health and environmental effects.97 The registration pro-
cess includes in part, an approval of the pesticide’s label. The label is critical 
to assure that the product is used correctly to optimize effective performance 
as well as to minimize the risks of use for humans and the environment. The 
labelling requirements, driven by the EPA’s human health and environmental 
risk assessments, address directions for use as well as appropriate warnings 
for safe use.98 
A. EPA’s Risk Based Approach to Protect Human Health 
To evaluate human health risk assessments, first the EPA determines the 
hazard of the chemical as well as how sensitive humans are to this hazard.99 
These two steps are referred to by the EPA as the “hazard identification” and 
the “dose-response assessment” steps. 100 This information is gathered from 
the submitted toxicity studies generated by the registrants.101 Next, the EPA 
estimates how much pesticide a person may come in contact with, given the 
proposed use of the chemical.102 This step is called the “exposure 
 
 95. Id. at § 136(u). “The term ‘pesticide’ means (1) any substance or mixture of substances intended 
for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest, (2) any substance or mixture of substances 
intended for use as a plant regulator, defoliant, or desiccant, and (3) any nitrogen stabilizer,…etc.” 
 96. Id. at § 136(bb). 
 97. See U.S. EPA, supra note 85. 
 98. Id. 
 99. U.S. EPA, Overview of Risk Assessment in the Pesticide Program, https://www.epa.gov/pesti-
cide-science-and-assessing-pesticide-risks/overview-risk-assessment-pesticide-program, (last visited 
Dec. 29, 2018); U.S. EPA, Assessing Human Health Risk from Pesticides, https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-
science-and-assessing-pesticide-risks/assessing-human-health-risk-pesticides, (last visited Dec. 29, 
2018). 
 100. Id. (The EPA uses a four-step processed from the National Research Council for human health 
risk assessments: “Step 1 – Hazard Identification Examines whether a substance has the potential to 
cause harm to humans and/or ecological systems, and if so, under what circumstances. Step 2 – Dose-
Response Assessment Examines the numerical relationship between exposure and effects. Step 3 – Ex-
posure Assessment Examines what is known about the frequency, timing, and levels of contact with a 
substance. Step 4 – Risk Characterization Examines how well the data support conclusions about the 
nature and extent of the risk from exposure to pesticides.”). 
 101. Id. (Toxicity tests are used to determine potential adverse health effects on adults, infants, and 
children. Studies submitted by pesticide registrants which are evaluated by EPA include acute, sub-
chronic, chronic, developmental and reproductive, and mutagenicity toxicity testing. See also U.S. EPA, 
Toxicity Tests for Human Health Assessments for Pesticides, https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-science-and-
assessing-pesticide-risks/toxicity-tests-human-health-assessments-pesticides (last visited Dec. 30, 2019). 
 102. Id. 
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assessment,” and it takes into account “what is known about the frequency, 
timing, and levels of contact with the substance.”103 Last, the EPA character-
izes the overall risk.104 One important outcome of the overall human health 
risk assessment, for example, is the determination of the chemical’s carcino-
genicity classification, or potential to cause cancer.105 
There are two main risk areas for humans, which may result from exposure 
to pesticides. These are exposure to residues of pesticides on food and occu-
pational exposure as a pesticide applicator. Two other risk areas for people 
which are also evaluated by the EPA, but not considered here, are bystander 
exposure (i.e., during a pesticide application) and residential risk (exposure 
to pesticides used within a home).106 As a result of the overall risk assess-
ment, the EPA sets tolerances and establishes the pesticide labelling require-
ments. 
1. Dietary Risk Assessment 
For the dietary risk assessment, the “exposure assessment” data is derived 
from product-specific studies submitted by registrants where they have meas-
ured the pesticide residue levels on foods.107 These data are then combined 
with national food consumption surveys to determine the anticipated dietary 
exposure for each pesticide.108 The “hazard identification” and the “dose-re-
sponse assessment” are derived from the toxicity studies the registrant 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. U.S. EPA, Evaluating Pesticides for Carcinogenic Potential, https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-sci-
ence-and-assessing-pesticide-risks/evaluating-pesticides-carcinogenic-potential (last visited Dec. 29, 
2018). (EPA’s most recent guidelines for cancer risk assessment was released in 2005 and is available at 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-09/documents/cancer_guidelines_final_3-25-05.pdf). 
 106. U.S. EPA, Guidance for Human Health Risk Assessments for Pesticides, 
https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-science-and-assessing-pesticide-risks/guidance-human-health-risk-as-
sessments-pesticides (last visited Dec. 29, 2018). (See also U.S. EPA, Office of Pesticide Programs, 
AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON ASSESSING EXPOSURE FROM PESTICIDES IN FOOD, A USER’S GUIDE, (June 
21, 2000) available at https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OPP-2007-0780-0001). 
 107. U.S. EPA, Data Requirements for Pesticide Registration, Residue Chemistry, 
https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-registration/data-requirements-pesticide-registration#rc (last visited Dec. 
29, 2018); U.S. EPA, Setting Tolerances for Pesticide Residues in Foods, Tolerance Setting Requires 
Numerous Scientific Studies, https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-tolerances/setting-tolerances-pesticide-resi-
dues-foods#scientific-study (last visited Dec. 29, 2018); 40 C.F.R. § 158.1410 (2018). 
 108. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics, National 
Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nhanes/wweia.htm (last visited Dec. 
29, 2018) (The What We Eat in America (WWEIA) survey is the dietary portion of the National Health 
and Nutrition Survey Examination (NHANSE) conducted by USDA and DHHS for the years 2003-2004); 
Food Commodity Intake Database, What We Eat in America, FoodRisk.org, http://fcid.foodrisk.org (last 
visited Dec. 29, 2018) (The U.S. EPA’s Office of Pesticide Programs developed the WWEIA Food Com-
modity Intake Database (FCID) 2005-10 to improve and update the food consumption data used for their 
pesticide dietary exposure assessments, conducted for the years 2005-10). 
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submits.109 These three assessments (exposure, hazard, and dose-response) 
are then used to determine the overall dietary risk assessment.110 The EPA 
uses this dietary risk assessment to set the safe tolerance limits for a pesti-
cide’s residues on foods.111 Since the passage of the FQPA, the EPA applies 
a ten-fold safety factor when setting tolerances to account for any potential 
hazards to infants (including prenatal effects) and children.112 In summary, 
when the EPA sets tolerances, the dietary risk assessment uses data from 
product-specific studies and current food consumption surveys, and then a 
ten-fold safety factor is applied. Thus, the EPA’s dietary risk assessment is 
well considered and offers substantial protections from dietary exposure to 
pesticides even for the most vulnerable populations. 
2. Risk Assessment for Pesticide Applicators 
For the pesticide applicator, the process of the risk assessment is similar to 
the dietary risk assessment, yet there is a key difference which has left pesti-
cide applicators at risk. The major difference is that for pesticide applicators, 
the exposure assessment piece of the risk assessment is based on generic data 
from the 1990’s along with supplemental data as it has become available, 
while a dietary risk assessment uses current, product-specific data in the form 
of the studies submitted by the registrants and updated food consumption 
surveys.113 As a result, the risk assessment for pesticide applicators is far 
more susceptible to error than is the dietary risk assessment. Impacts of this 
limitation in incorrect risk assessment for the pesticide applicator are far 
reaching. 
a) Exposure Assessment for Pesticide Applicators 
When determining exposure to pesticides for applicators, the EPA uses 
data from the Pesticide Handler Exposure Database (PHED), the Outdoor 
Residential Exposure Task Force (ORETF), and the Agricultural Handler Ex-
posure Task Force (AHETF), as well as exposure monitoring studies from 
 
 109. U.S. EPA, Data Requirements for Pesticide Registration, Data from Studies that Determine 
Hazard to Humans and Domestic Animals, https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-registration/data-requirements-
pesticide-registration#dh; 40 C.F.R. § 158.500 (2018). 
 110. U.S. EPA, Risk Assessment, conducting a Human Health Risk Assessment, 
https://www.epa.gov/risk/conducting-human-health-risk-assessment (last visited Dec. 29, 2018). 
 111. U.S. EPA, Setting Tolerances for Pesticide Residues in Foods, https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-
tolerances/setting-tolerances-pesticide-residues-foods (last visited Dec. 29, 2018). 
 112. U.S. EPA, Determination of the Appropriate FQPA Safety Factor(s) in Assessing Pesticide Tol-
erances, ii, (2002), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-07/documents/determ.pdf. 
 113. See U.S. EPA, supra note 104. 
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the registrant if available.114 The PHED and the databases compiled by the 
ORETF and AHETF provide exposure values that are based on historical 
data and computer modeling.115 As a result, these exposure values are not 
product-specific, and for any given chemical and set of application circum-
stances, the values could be entirely wrong. 
The limitations of the available exposure values used for pesticide appli-
cators is acknowledged by the regulatory authorities. For example, the USDA 
Forest Service has developed its own risk assessments for their pesticide ap-
plicators because the EPA’s exposure assessments are inadequate to address 
the needs of their workers.116 Furthermore, the PHED database is still used 
as the basis of most pesticide applicator exposure assessments, even though 
this database is considered outdated by the EPA.117 The PHED was initiated 
by a Task Force in the late 1980’s and was designed to provide a generic 
database for estimating applicator exposure using data collected under actual 
field conditions, yet almost thirty years later, the system’s main weakness is 
an insufficient amount of data. 118, 119 
The EPA intends to eventually replace the PHED with the AHETF and the 
ORETF databases, along with any other applicable data submitted by the 
 
 114. U.S. EPA, Occupational Pesticide Handler Exposure Data, https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-sci-
ence-and-assessing-pesticide-risks/occupational-pesticide-handler-exposure-data#data-assess (last vis-
ited Dec. 29, 2018). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Patrick R. Durkin, Preparation of Environmental Documentation and Risk Assessments for the 
USDA/Forest Service, Syracuse Envt. Res. Assoc., Inc., (2014), https://www.fs.fed.us/foresthealth/pesti-
cide/pdfs/PrepEnvirmentalDoc_11-2014.pdf; U.S. Forest Service, Pesticide Management & Coordina-
tion, Risk Assessments, https://www.fs.fed.us/foresthealth/protecting-forest/integrated-pest-manage-
ment/pesticide-management/pesticide-risk-assessments.shtml (last visited Dec. 29, 2018) (Separate hu-
man health risk assessments are performed by the Forest Service. Citing two cases where the courts have 
held that Forest Service is “required to do an independent assessment of the safety of pesticides rather 
than relying on FIFRA registration alone.” See Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1248 (9th 
Circuit, 1984) and Southern Oregon Citizens v. Clark, 720 F. 2d 1475, 1480 (9th Cir. 1983)). 
 117. U.S. EPA, Occupational Pesticide Handler Exposure Data, Pesticide Handler Exposure Data-
base (PHED), https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-science-and-assessing-pesticide-risks/occupational-pesti-
cide-handler-exposure-data#phed (last visited Dec. 29, 2018). See also https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-
registration/prn-2007-3-agricultural-handlers-exposure-task-force-llc#ahetf (lasted vised on Aug. 15, 
2019) (“Since the development of PHED, it has become clear that some handler exposure scenarios are 
not adequately covered in this database. Some of the existing data do not fully represent of current expo-
sure patterns due to changes in work practices, formulations, and equipment. However, these data still 
represent the best available information for assessing handler exposure. In January 2007, EPA convened 
a FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel (SAP) to address the need for a new generation of handler exposure 
data and to recommend methods for generating them. The Panel confirmed the need for new handler 
exposure studies and generally supported the methods proposed by the AHETF for conducting these stud-
ies.”) 
 118. Id. 
 119. Timothy M. Leighton & Alan P. Nielsen, The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Health 
Canada, and National Agricultural Chemicals Association Pesticide Handlers Exposure Database 10:4 
APPLIED OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVTL. HYGIENE, 270, 270-73 (1995). 
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registrations.120 However, the OREFT and the AHETF task forces were ini-
tiated in 1994 and 2001, respectively, and the process of updating and replac-
ing PHED remains incomplete.121 As a result, the EPA is still using this out-
dated, incomplete data set to conduct risk assessments for pesticide applica-
tors. 
b) Increased Cancer Risk for Pesticide Applicators 
Although the EPA is aware of the shortcomings in the exposure assess-
ment, this knowledge has not translated into new regulations. Consequently, 
it is no surprise that the incidence of some cancers is occurring in increased 
amounts for pesticide applicators.122 This troubling finding was the conclu-
sion of Phase I of the Agricultural Health Study (AHS), which occurred be-
tween 1993 and 1997.123 The AHS is a long term epidemiologic study con-
ducted by the EPA, along with the National Cancer Institute, the National 
Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, and National Institute for Occu-
pational Safety and Health.124 Phase I of the AHS occurred between 1993 and 
1997.125 In this study the health of more than 89,000 certified pesticide ap-
plicators and their spouses from Iowa and North Carolina was evaluated.126 
Further evaluations of these data have been conducted after Phase I was 
completed to better understand these results. In one such investigation, the 
researchers recommended that additional factors not currently evaluated 
should be used when making exposure assessments for pesticide applicators, 
such as lifetime days of pesticide use.127 This conclusion was published in 
2005.128  To date, these findings have not been incorporated fully into the risk 
assessments for pesticide applicators. Instead, the EPA currently uses the 
 
 120. See U.S. EPA, supra note 114. 
 121. U.S. EPA, Occupational Pesticide Handler Exposure Data, https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-sci-
ence-and-assessing-pesticide-risks/occupational-pesticide-handler-exposure-data#data-assess (last vis-
ited Dec. 29, 2018); U.S. EPA, Occupational Pesticide Handler Exposure Data, Occupational Pesticide 
Handler Exposure Calculator, https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-science-and-assessing-pesticide-risks/oc-
cupational-pesticide-handler-exposure-data#calculator (last visited Dec. 29, 2018). 
 122. Alavanja MC, et al., Increased cancer burden among pesticide applicators and others due to 
pesticide exposure, 63(2) CA CANCER J CLIN. 120-42 (2013). 
 123. U.S. NIH, Agricultural Health Study, https://aghealth.nih.gov/about/index.html (last visited 
Dec. 29, 2018). 
 124. Id. 
 125. U.S. EPA, Science Inventory, Cancer Incidence in the Agricultural Health Study, 
https://cfpub.epa.gov/si/si_public_record_report.cfm?dirEntryId=104870&Lab=NERL (last visited Dec. 
29, 2018). 
 126. See U.S. NIH, supra note 120. 
 127. C. Samanic et al., Factor analysis of pesticide use patterns among pesticide applicators in the 
Agricultural Health Study, 15(3) J EXPO ANAL ENVIRON EPIDEMIOL 225-33 (2005). 
 128. Id. 
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AHS to “inform regulatory policies and practice.”129 No new regulations have 
been promulgated as a result of the AHS (and related studies) to provide a 
comprehensive, accurate exposure assessment for pesticide applicators.130 
B. EPA’s Agricultural Worker Protection Standard Falls Short 
The EPA has made some efforts to update the regulations, yet this effort 
falls short of what is needed. For instance, the EPA has updated the Agricul-
tural Worker Protection Standard (WPS), which is a standard designed to 
provide protections to pesticide applicators from the hazards associated with 
using a “restricted use product” (RUP).131 RUPs cannot be sold or used by 
the general public.132 Only certified pesticide applicators, or those working 
under the direct supervision of a certified pesticide applicator, can use and 
apply a RUP.133 
The EPA will determine if the chemical is a RUP based on the risk assess-
ment.134 Chemicals not classified as a RUP remain unclassified, or for gen-
eral use.135 A chemical will be classified as a RUP if the EPA determines that 
added restrictions are necessary in order to avoid unreasonable adverse ef-
fects to the environment or harm to pesticide applicators or bystanders.136 
Therefore, the RUP classification is dependent in part on the risk assessment 
conducted specifically for pesticide applicators. If there are any errors in this 
risk assessment, the classification of a chemical will be incorrect. 
Certified pesticide applicators must comply with the WPS and must 
demonstrate a working understanding of how to apply pesticides safely.137 
The recent update to the WPS includes increased competency standards, a 
nation-wide minimum age limit for pesticide applicators, and a five-year 
maximum recertification interval.138 However, the WPS does not address 
 
 129. U.S. EPA, How EPA Protects Workers from Pesticide Risk, Risk Assessment, 
https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-worker-safety/how-epa-protects-workers-pesticide-risk#risk-assessment 
(last visited Dec. 29, 2018). 
 130. Id. 
 131. U.S. EPA, Pesticide Worker Safety, Federal Certification Standards for Pesticide Applicators, 
https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-worker-safety/federal-certification-standards-pesticide-applicators(last 
visited Dec. 29, 2018). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. 40 C.F.R. §152.160 (2018). 
 136. U.S. EPA, Pesticide Worker Safety, Restricted Use Products (RUP) Report, 
https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-worker-safety/restricted-use-products-rup-report (last visited Dec. 29, 
2018). 
 137. 40 C.F.R. § 170.130 (2018). 
 138. 40 C.F.R. §§ 171.103-105 (2018). 
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how the exposure or risk assessment for pesticide applications are con-
ducted.139 
Therefore, although the update to the WPS regulation provides protections 
from chemicals that are already classified as a RUP, there is no safeguard 
against the use of chemicals which are mislabeled as “general use” due to the 
shortcomings in the risk assessment. Because the RUP classification is de-
pendent on a correct risk assessment for pesticide applicators, this has created 
a loophole in the regulations. Furthermore, the EPA has been aware of this 
issue for more than thirty years. Although the EPA has recognized as early 
as 1997 that pesticide applicators endure at a higher incidence for some can-
cers, the EPA has yet to fully address the crux of the issue. That is, how to 
define the risk in the first place so that appropriate precautions can be taken 
while using the product. 
In summary, the lack of an accurate exposure assessment is a critical gap 
in the regulations. This information is needed in order to accurately define 
the overall risk, and accurately classify the pesticide as a RUP. This infor-
mation is necessary to label the products correctly to identify the risks and 
allow pesticide applicators to appropriately protect themselves. 
IV. CONSEQUENCES FOR PESTICIDE APPLICATORS – A CASE STUDY 
The impact of not accurately addressing risks to pesticide applicators is 
substantial. An example of this can be found in a California case where De-
wayne Johnson, a Black school groundskeeper, brought an action against 
Monsanto asserting that his occupational exposure to glyphosate as a pesti-
cide applicator caused him to develop cancer.140 In his complaint, Johnson 
asserted that Monsanto knew of the human health risks, but the product label 
did not contain the appropriate warnings.141 As a result, Johnson did not take 
the necessary precautions and was exposed to a toxic chemical.142 Johnson 
supported this claim by referencing the International Agency for Research on 
Cancer (IRAC) of the World Health Organization classification of glypho-
sate as a “Group 2A, probable carcinogen.”143 
 
 139. 40 C.F.R. § 170 (2018). 
 140. Johnson, 2018 WL 2324413. 
 141. Complaint for Damages and Demand for Jury Trial, Johnson V. Monsanto Co., No. 16-550128, 
2016 WL 347894, at*5-6 (Cal. Super. Jan. 28, 2016). 
 142. Id. at 15. 
 143. Id. at 2; Iɴᴛᴇʀɴᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ Aɢᴇɴᴄʏ ꜰᴏʀ Rᴇꜱᴇᴀʀᴄʜ ᴏɴ Cᴀɴᴄᴇʀ, Wᴏʀʟᴅ Hᴇᴀʟᴛʜ Oʀɢᴀɴɪᴢᴀᴛɪᴏɴ, IARC 
Monographs Questions and Answers, 2, (2018) https://www.iarc.fr/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Mono-
graphs-QA.pdf (“Group 2A: The agent is probably carcinogenic to humans. This category is used when 
there is limited evidence of carcinogenicity in humans and sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity in ex-
perimental animals. Limited evidence means that a positive association has been observed between expo-
sure to the agent and cancer but that other explanations for the observations (technically termed chance, 
bias, or confounding) could not be ruled out.”). 
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However, as recently as 2015, the EPA has classified glyphosate as “Not 
Likely to be Carcinogenic to Humans,”144 and again in April 2019, EPA re-
affirmed that they do not consider glyphosate a carcinogen.145 Furthermore, 
glyphosate has been assessed by the EPA several times since its first regis-
tration in 1974, and is not currently classified as a RUP.146 Thus, Johnson’s 
assertion, supported by the IRAC’s classification of glyphosate as a carcino-
gen, was in direct contrast to the EPA’s findings. 
In its defense, Monsanto argued that the EPA’s approval of glyphosate 
under the FIFRA was conclusive and the product was safe.147 Nevertheless, 
the California court ruled that the product’s label failed to contain a cancer 
warning and the jury award was in the high millions.148 
A. Implications of Johnson 
Glyphosate was originally sold for weed control in soybeans genetically 
engineered to be tolerant to the chemical.149  It is now one of the most widely 
used herbicides in the U.S.150 In agriculture, glyphosate is used on an array 
of genetically engineered fruits, vegetables, and row crops. Glyphosate prod-
ucts are also sold to the general public for home use in lawns and gardens.151 
Because glyphosate products are so commonly used, Johnson has drawn sig-
nificant attention. Thousands of new plaintiffs (18,400 at the time of this 
publication)152 have filed similar suits claiming that exposure to glyphosate 
has caused them or their relatives cancer since the Johnson ruling.153 
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genic Potential, 13, 1-216 (2017), https://cfpub.epa.gov/si/si_public_file_download.cfm?p_down-
load_id=534487. 
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 152. Monsanto Papers, Roundup (Glyphosate) Cancer Cases: Key Documents & Analysis, U.S. Right 
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Furthermore, because the EPA has determined that glyphosate is not a car-
cinogen, the ruling in Johnson has focused considerable attention on the car-
cinogenicity status of glyphosate. Some of the arguments in Johnson relating 
to the cancer causation were focused on epidemiology, toxicology, and gen-
otoxicity/mechanism studies.154  Nevertheless, the key issue in Johnson 
which can be leveraged to bring about regulatory change is the difference 
between the EPA and the IRAC’s classification system for carcinogens. That 
is, the primary difference between the EPA and the IRAC is how the expo-
sure element is used in the risk assessment.155 Because of this fundamental 
difference in the risk assessment process, the EPA and the IRAC have 
reached different conclusions.156 
The IRAC does not use an exposure assessment for determining risks.157 
Instead, the IRAC classification system is based only on an evaluation of 
whether the chemical can cause cancer (i.e., its “hazard” identification).158 
The EPA’s carcinogenicity classification, on the other hand, is based on the 
exposure assessment.159 Because the EPA’s exposure assessment for pesti-
cide applicators is outdated and prone to error, it is no surprise that the EPA 
and the IRAC have come up with two different conclusions on the carcino-
genicity potential of glyphosate. 
If the EPA were to use the IRAC’s system of determining risk for glypho-
sate, a more protective risk assessment would result. Glyphosate, which is 
currently a general use pesticide, would likely be reclassified as a RUP.160 
This would drastically limit market share as it could no longer be sold to the 
general public for use in the home. Even though it is possible that glyphosate 
may actually be safe for home use, the risks to pesticide applicators will 
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necessarily be higher given their routine and prolonged use as part of their 
normal daily work. Nevertheless, to protect pesticide applicators from seri-
ous health risks, a loss of market share for the manufacturer is justifiable and 
may be necessary. 
B. No Preemption by FIFRA for Johnson’s Common Law Claim 
In Johnson, Monsanto moved for summary judgement on the basis that 
Johnson’s claims were preempted by federal law.161 Monsanto argued that 
because the EPA had approved of glyphosate label without a cancer warning 
under the FIFRA, the State of California could not impose additional label-
ling requirements and the company was immune from liability.162 However, 
the Supreme Court has previously ruled in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC 
that common law claims which impose label changes that are “consistent 
with” or “equivalent to” the FIFRA can survive preemption challenges.163 
Citing Bates, the Johnson court held that a state law which requires manu-
facturers to warn of a risk which is either “known or knowable (in strict lia-
bility)” or one that “a reasonably prudent manufacturer would have known 
or warned about (in negligence)” is no broader than the FIFRA.164 
The FIFRA contains an express preemption provision and it is limited to 
requirements “for labelling or packaging” that are “in addition to or differ-
ent from those required under [FIFRA].” Bates, 544 U.S.at 444; 7 U.S.C.§ 
136v(b). For example, the state is expressly permitted to ban a pesticide that 
is approved by the EPA. Bates, 544 U.S.at 446; 7 U.S.C.§ 136v(a). Under 
the express terms of the statute, EPA approval of a pesticide is not a defense 
for the commission of any offense under FIFRA, it is just prima facie evi-
dence that the pesticide and its labelling and packaging are compliant with 
FIFRA and, accordingly, any state law that imposes labelling requirements 
consistent with FIFRA is not preempted.165 
Under this rationale, the Johnson court dismissed Monsanto’s motion for 
summary judgement. 
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V. POTENTIAL LEGAL REMEDIES 
Two options exist for pesticide applicators who have suffered an injury 
from exposure to a pesticide, such as glyphosate. First, if the party was per-
sonally injured, they can bring a common law claim for products liability 
against the manufacturer, as in Johnson. If proven true, claims such as John-
son’s can survive a preemption challenge and have a good chance of success. 
However, the major drawback to this path is the significant cost in time and 
money for the individual plaintiff. 
As an alternative, a successful suit against the EPA for failure to enforce 
FIFRA for the protection of pesticide applicators could be brought. Because 
pesticide applicators are primarily minorities, a remedy under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause is available to demand an equal enforcement of FIFRA.  This 
would raise the protection of minority pesticide applicators to the same level 
that is now enjoyed by the majority. For example, in 1996 Congress passed 
the FQPA in response to pressures from environmental advocates who sued 
the EPA for failing to enforce their own stated zero-tolerance policy for car-
cinogens. However, the focus of FQPA was food consumers, particularly in-
fants and children, and not minority pesticide applicators. Because people of 
all races consume food, but pesticide applicators are primarily minorities, this 
demographic was prejudicially excluded, once again, from the benefits of the 
new legal protections, particularly relating to carcinogens. This is the same 
pattern of the racially driven exclusion of minority farm workers that was 
seen in the passage of the NLRA, FLSA, and the OSHA legislations decades 
earlier. 
The EPA has a statutory obligation under FIFRA to protect humans and 
the environment from the unreasonably adverse effects of pesticides. It is 
problematic that the individuals who need the greatest protection because 
they are exposed to the highest levels of the most toxic pesticides, have the 
least protection under the EPA’s current regulations. As discussed herein, the 
exposure assessments used by the EPA during its risk assessments for pesti-
cide applicators are outdated, confusing, and unaligned, even within the gov-
ernment (i.e., the USDA’s Forest Service conducts separate risk assessments 
for pesticides). The PHED, one of the main databases the EPA relies on, is 
more than thirty years old. This alone is unreasonable. Finally, it is uncon-
scionable that the progression of regulations protecting minority pesticide 
applicators have lagged behind other populations. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The regulations of pesticides in the U.S. have evolved as social awareness 
for the need to go beyond protecting economic interests has increased. A gap 
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in the regulations highlighted by Johnson points to one area where economic 
interests still have the upper hand. Pesticide applicators today are still ex-
posed to unreasonable risks. 
The time has come for a change, and Johnson is the trigger. Equal enforce-
ment of FIFRA for the protection of all humans could result in fewer unclas-
sified pesticides, and as a result, lower profits for industry. Even so, it is the 
right thing to do. It is critical that we finally reverse our history protecting 
the affluence of the wealthy at the expense of the health and welfare of Blacks 
and other minorities. 
